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What Workers Say 
Introduction 
The Anglo-American Economies 
and Employee Voice 
RICHARD B. FREEMAN, PETER BOXALL, AND PETER HAYNES 
This book is about employee voice in the workplaces of the highly developed 
Anglo-American economies: the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand. These are among the most economically 
successful countries in the world. Despite being located in three different geo-
graphic areas, the Anglo-American countries have a common language and le-
gal tradition, have close economic and political ties, and are linked by flows of 
people, goods, and capital. Many of the same firms operate in each country. 
The unions in each pay more attention to their counterparts within the group 
than to unions in other countries. The Anglo-American brand of capitalism— 
market oriented and open to competition, with modest welfare states and in-
come transfer systems—differentiates the countries from countries in the "so-
cial dialogue" model of the European Union (although the United Kingdom 
and Ireland are part of the Union) and from the highly unionized labor system 
of Scandinavia. 
Similarities among the Anglo-American countries notwithstanding, ana-
lysts rarely consider them as representatives of a broad class of capitalist 
economies. Many studies compare the other Anglo-American countries to the 
United States, which directs attention to differences among the countries rather 
than to commonalities. In this book we argue that the six countries are suffi-
ciently alike to make them a distinct capitalist model while also evincing suffi-
cient variety to enable us to derive useful lessons from comparisons among 
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them. Were Darwin to return as a social scientist and journey to the Anglo-
American countries to observe their labor relations, he would note the famil-
ial similarities and common descent from the United Kingdom. He would 
ponder the different adaptations to the economic and social environment, just 
as he noted the varieties among plants and animals in various parts of the world 
during his journey aboard the Beagle. At the turn of the twenty-first century, 
he would also note that the traditional institution for worker voice and power, 
the trade union, is facing substantial pressures in all of the Anglo-American 
countries. In the United States and Australia, the union movements are in deep 
crisis. In the other four countries, unions are also struggling to respond to chal-
lenges from employers, globalization, and neoliberal economic policies. 
What Workers Say: Goals, Terms, and Methodology 
Although trade unions are invariably a central concern in any study of em-
ployee voice, this book goes further in considering nonunion as well as union 
voice in the six advanced Anglo-American countries. Our aim is to identify the 
voice workers have in those countries and compare it with the voice they want. 
Workers are the main "consumers" of the institutions that govern workplaces, 
which makes it incumbent on government, unions, and business to pay close 
attention to the views of workers in constructing or reforming those institu-
tions. We designed What Workers Say to assess employee attitudes with mini-
mal prompting from researchers. As much as survey methodology permits, we 
have let workers in the Anglo-American world speak for themselves about their 
employment institutions and experiences—and about the reforms that might 
improve employee representation and participation. 
To examine employee voice in the six countries in a way that facilitates com-
parison, we organized a team of country experts in labor relations and labor 
markets. We coordinated their work through the Internet and then through a 
workshop at the University of Auckland in September 2004. Our team of re-
searchers adopted a common research methodology: to examine employee 
views from a linked set of surveys based broadly on the 1994-95 Worker Rep-
resentation and Participation Survey in the United States (Freeman and Rogers 
1999) and the 2001 British Worker Representation and Participation Survey (Di-
amond and Freeman 2002).1 Although the surveys drew their inspiration from 
this common base, researchers modified questions to suit their country con-
text, to follow up on their particular interests, and, in some cases, to draw on 
other representative surveys. The original U.S. survey sampled 2,408 adult 
1
 In terms of specific methods, all but the United Kingdom survey gathered data by telephone in-
terview using standard computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) techniques. 
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workers in private-sector firms with more than twenty-five employees. The 
other surveys included all groups of workers. The British study involved face-
to-face interviews with some thirteen hundred randomly chosen workers. The 
Canadian survey used the 1996 Canada-U.S. Labor Attitudes Survey by Lipset 
and Meltz (1997, 2004), which drew many items from Freeman and Rogers 
(1999). This survey sampled 1,495 workers. The Australian and New Zealand 
surveys randomly drew 1,000 workers from residential telephone directories. 
The Irish survey randomly sampled 1,420 workers. 
In addition to these country studies, we recruited experts to consider the im-
plications for the institutional parties across the whole set. Thus, the book in-
corporates analyses of the implications for unions, employers, and government. 
While the surveys ask questions in different ways to fit the particular insti-
tutional and demographic context of the country under study, they all seek to 
compare the voice workers have in their workplaces with the voice they want 
to have. But what do we mean by "voice"? We understand employee voice as in-
corporating representative voice and various forms of participation developed 
directly between management and workers. Trade unionism has been the his-
torical vehicle for formal representation of worker interests, but, outside the 
United States, workers can legitimately have formal voice regarding their work-
ing conditions through structures such as joint consultative committees and 
works councils. The role of unions in nonunion committees and councils 
varies. In some cases, union representatives are deeply involved in these orga-
nizations, while, in other cases, the committees or councils operate in work-
places that are not unionized. Representation thus traverses both union and 
nonunion institutions. 
Participation covers an array of activities in which managers engage work-
ers in work-related decisions, either on the job or off it, and through which 
workers can exercise some kind of influence in how their work is organized or 
their workplaces are run. These vary across the Anglo-American world from the 
"town hall" meetings seen in the United States to the team briefing processes 
used in the United Kingdom to the employee involvement groups, problem-
solving teams, and more autonomous jobs now found, to some extent, not only 
in the Anglo-American countries but throughout the world. 
Although it is common to draw a distinction between representation of em-
ployee interests and employee participation in management, we note that there 
is considerable overlap between representation and participation and the in-
stitutions designed to foster them. Managers, for example, often design con-
sultative structures with participation in mind—to inform and to get worker 
support for management proposals but to stop well short of negotiation of in-
terests. On the other hand, structures starting life as top-down channels may 
"morph" into forums in which management listens to, and then acts on, em-
ployee concerns about their interests. Similarly, unions that represent workers 
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in collective bargaining may also facilitate employee involvement in produc-
tion decisions. Rather than assuming we know what is going on in the differ-
ent forms, we ask workers to tell us what is happening and whether they find 
it effective. Collectively, the What Workers Say surveys enable us to address four 
core sets of questions about the representation and participation of Anglo-
American workers at their workplaces: 
1. Union representation gaps: To what extent, if at all, do workers want 
greater union representation than they have at their workplaces? Are some 
groups of workers more frustrated in their inability to gain union repre-
sentation than others? Are some workplaces or sectors more prone to 
frustrated union demand? 
2. Worker attitudes toward representation generally: In the broadest possible 
terms, how do workers feel about the different ways their interests are rep-
resented in their firm? What can unions, in particular, learn from worker 
desires for representation and assessment of the effectiveness of institu-
tions to meet those desires? 
3. Worker attitudes toward participation and styles of voice: How do workers 
feel about employer-driven forms of influence? Are these forms more ef-
fective when complementary with unionism? How well do they work in-
dependent of unionism? What styles of engagement with employers do 
workers seek? 
4. Employee voice and public policy reform: Art there "institutional rigidities" 
that render public policy on employee voice ineffective in some Anglo-
American countries? What institutional models are more successful in giv-
ing workers the voice they seek at workplaces? 
The first of these questions, focused on the union representation gap, car-
ries forward a key concern in the work of Freeman and Rogers (1999). We know 
that a large number of workers in the United States want union representation 
but cannot obtain it. How large is this unfilled demand for unionism in other 
Anglo-American countries, and what can we say about where it occurs? 
The second question is a more general one, examining how workers feel 
about representation more broadly, including their assessment of the relative 
costs and benefits of unionism. Better understanding of contemporary worker 
attitudes toward representative voice is important for all parties but is critical 
for unions if they wish to modernize their operations to provide more work-
ers what they want from a workplace organization. 
The third question is the natural companion to the second one. Through-
out the Anglo-American world, the decline of unions has occurred in parallel 
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with the rise of management-driven forms of participation, often concentrated 
on individual rather than collective voice. To what extent do management-led 
voice systems fill a role that workers consider valuable? How are management-
led systems connected to union voice? Given a choice, what style of engagement 
do workers want with their employers? 
Finally, we assess implications for public policy. Which countries have de-
veloped institutions that are worth emulating and in what ways? Which pre-
vent workers from obtaining the voice that they seek? Our overriding goal here 
is to provide the information so that decision makers in these societies can find 
ways to improve their voice regimes for the benefit of workers, employers, 
unions, and society as a whole. 
Although the personal predilections of researchers invariably influence the 
tone and direction of their work, we and the chapter authors have tried to min-
imize a priori views and theoretical preconceptions to focus on the empirics of 
the representative surveys. We want to report what workers say, not what we as 
researchers think they ought to say. In this introduction, we set the stage for the 
rest of the book by focusing on the Anglo-American economies as a distinct 
group in comparative labor relations. We examine the commonalities among 
the six countries that distinguish them from other advanced countries and 
highlight some of the key differences within the group. We explain how the 
book is organized and outline what lies ahead. 
Classifying Economies: Common Descent 
and Common Characteristics 
Do the economies and labor systems of the United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand constitute a single family or 
type of capitalist labor institutions that merit analysis as an economic model 
comparable to the "Nordic" model of the Scandinavian countries or the -EU 
"social dialogue" model that represents the advanced continental EU coun-
tries? We argue that they do, in two stages. First, we define the attributes that 
economies should have in common to be classified as a single group. Then we 
show that the Anglo-American economies have these attributes. We reach our 
conclusion that the Anglo-American economies are a single family on the ba-
sis of their British heritage; the similarities in the rules they use to govern la-
bor market and other economic transactions; the similarities in the de facto 
operation of their economic and labor institutions; and their pattern of decline 
in collective bargaining compared to other advanced countries. We further 
show that adjacent countries—the United States/Canada, the United King-
dom/Ireland, Australia/New Zealand—have particularly close institutional 
arrangements, which justifies treating them as pairs in some analyses. 
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Economists classify economies largely on the basis of the extent to which 
they rely on private property and competitive markets to allocate resources and 
distribute income. At one end is the "invisible hand" capitalist economy, where 
private property predominates and almost everything operates through mar-
kets. With the collapse of Communist planned economies, where the state 
owns productive property and almost everything operates through govern-
ment decisions, we are left at the other end of the spectrum with more in-
stitution-driven market economies, which rely extensively on social dialogue 
between business and labor in decision making (Freeman 2006). The "war of 
the models" among advanced capitalist economies is between economies 
where market forces determine wages and employment with little role for 
institutions to affect outcomes and those where institutions—unions, cen-
tralized or coordinated bargaining, government regulations—also affect the 
outcomes. 
Most studies use observable laws or practices to assess how much a given 
labor market or economy relies on markets as opposed to institutions. Does 
the country have employment protection legislation? Do employer federa-
tions bargain with centralized union groups? Are minimum wages important? 
And so on. Some classifications focus on the similarity in de jure labor (and 
other) codes and regulations among countries (Botero et al. 2003). Others deal 
with observable procedures such as the centralization of collective bargaining 
(OECD 2004). Since de jure regulations may be weakly enforced and observ-
able institutions may operate differently in different countries, other classifi-
cations are based on surveys that ask respondents to report on actual practices 
on the ground (Chor and Freeman 2005). 
Biology, where classification is more important in analysis than it is in eco-
nomics, initially grouped animals and plants according to their observable or 
phenotypic similarity. Since then biologists have used the principle of common 
descent to classify creatures by their family tree or evolutionary history. Cladis-
tics, which relies extensively on statistical analysis of family trees, has morphed 
into molecular systematics based on genomic DNA analysis. Approaching the 
classification problem from a different perspective, economists have come to 
recognize the value of historical lineage in analyzing economies. They have be-
gun to use the lineage of institutions as an instrument to estimate the inde-
pendent effect of those institutions on outcomes (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001; Botero et al. 2003). 
To assess whether the Anglo-American economies are sufficiently alike to 
form a separate family among advanced economies, we consider their lineage/ 
common descent from Great Britain and their observable characteristics. 
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Historic Lineage/Common Descent 
The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and 
Ireland are countries where English is spoken (primarily) and are democracies 
with a heritage of British concepts of law and contract. In the Botero et al. 
(2003) classification of countries by legal tradition, they fit into the "Anglo 
common law" category, though French Canada embodies a French legal tradi-
tion. There is one reason for these similarities. All of the countries were colo-
nized by Great Britain. All but the United States and Ireland are members of 
the British Commonwealth. 
The lineage similarities go further. They include similar national origins of 
the populations. The countries have large British-ancestry populations. The 
North American countries and Australia and New Zealand have large Irish-ori-
gin populations, as well. This is because they offered Irish peasants opportu-
nity to escape a poor rural society when Ireland was a British colony. The 
United Kingdom and Ireland have an open border, so that the United Kingdom 
also has a large Irish immigrant population; and New Zealand and Australia 
have relatively open borders, which allow persons from one country to migrate 
and work in the other. Finally, there are other substantive people flows among 
the Anglo-American countries. The United Kingdom hosts large numbers of 
immigrants from the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Per-
sons born in Canada and Britain make up the largest proportion of advanced 
country immigrants to the United States. Persons born in Australia and New 
Zealand often work in the United Kingdom for some years, and many move to 
the United Kingdom permanendy. 
The flow of people affects the nature of unions and of business. Important 
union leaders in particular countries were immigrants or the children of im-
migrants from other Anglo-American countries. Samuel Gompers, founder of 
the American Federation of Labor, came to the United States from the United 
Kingdom. John L. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers of America, 
who helped found the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in the 
United States, was of Welsh descent. James Larkin, the founder of the Irish 
Transport and General Workers' Union, was born in Liverpool. The labor links 
are particularly strong between adjacent countries. Some Canadian unions are 
part of U.S. "internationals," and Canadians have attained the presidency of 
some of those unions: for instance, Lynn Williams and, later, Leo Gerard 
headed the United Steelworkers (USW). The Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
has close ties with the British Trades Union Congress (TUC). 
Business ownership patterns also overlap considerably. The United States is 
the largest investor in Canada. The United Kingdom has the largest foreign di-
rect investment position in the United States. The 1983 Australia New Zealand 
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Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) makes it relatively 
easy for firms from either country to invest in the other. 
The Anglo-American economies also share common characteristics in fi-
nancial markets and corporate governance structures, which has important 
implications for labor management. Strong emphasis on property rights and 
shareholder value, along with deep equity markets in the Anglo-American 
economies, buttresses more dispersed and less committed corporate owner-
ship than in many other advanced economies. In their survey of the ownership 
of large and medium companies in twenty-seven countries, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999, 512) found that "the United States shares rela-
tively high ownership dispersion with other countries with good shareholder 
protection, particularly the other rich common law countries," the latter com-
posed for the most part of other Anglo-American countries.2 Equity markets 
play a greater role in determining business ownership in the Anglo-American 
economies than in other economies. In 1997, for example, the value of the stock 
market in the United States and United Kingdom accounted for 100.9 and 
154.4 percent of GDP compared to no more than 31.4,40.6, and 58.1 percent 
in Germany, France, and Japan, respectively (Deutsches Aktieninstitut 1998, 
cited in Jurgens, Naumann, and Rupp 2000). 
Some analysts have argued that the shareholder-centered liberal model of 
corporate governance in the Anglo-American economies encourages short-
term thinking among corporate managers, resulting in significant underin-
vestment (Porter 1992; Shleifer and Vishny 1990; Stein 1988, 1989). While 
surveys of managers give some support to these arguments (Poterba and Sum-
mers 1995; Segelod 2000), the performance of the U.S. economy in the 1990s 
through the mid-2000s has muted such criticisms. Indeed, the tone of recent 
analysis of the liberal model has tended to the triumphalist: "The rest of the 
world seems to be following the U.S. lead" (Holmstrom and Kaplan 2003,19).3 
Whichever point of view is correct, financial and governance structures do 
seem to be related to labor-management practices. Comparing the United 
States and the United Kingdom with Japan and Germany, Gospel and Pendle-
ton (2003) argue that the Anglo-American finance and governance system 
leads to greater emphasis on the interests of capital vis-a-vis labor, short-term 
2Surveying investor protection laws in forty-nine nonsocialist countries, La Porta et al. (1998) 
found that the common law countries had significantly higher protections for investors than the 
various civil law countries. For shareholder protections there was less variation among the Anglo-
American countries than across the common law group as a whole, and the mean scores for the Anglo-
American countries were higher than that for the common law group as a whole. Although the 
common law countries scored below their Scandinavian civil law counterparts for strength of legal en-
forcement of investor rights, further calculation shows that the differences between the Anglo-Ameri-
can countries taken alone and the Scandinavian group were not significant at the .05 level for five of the 
six factors tested. 
3
 For a more balanced analysis, see Jacoby (2000) and Jurgens, Naumann, and Rupp (2000). 
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time frames, and financial objectives and measures, which in turn creates less 
secure employment, less in-house skills training, and more market-based 
methods to secure worker commitment as opposed to employee voice. 
Finally, in the area of economic thinking, there is a powerful, English-speak-
ing liberal economic tradition stemming from Adam Smith and Alfred Mar-
shall that differs in many respects from the economics tradition in continental 
Europe. And, while all union movements have some socialist leanings, the 
unions in the Anglo-American world have been more business-oriented than 
unions in many other advanced capitalist economies (Hyman 2001; Streeck 
and Hassel 2002). 
In sum, common descent and lineage suggest that the six English-speaking 
economies in this book constitute a single model or family of economies, com-
parable to families in biological taxonomy. Common lineage and descent does 
not, however, mean that economies operate according to the same rules or that, 
in the context of this book, their labor markets produce similar problems of 
worker representation and participation, much less solutions to those prob-
lems. We consider next whether the Anglo-American economies also meet the 
test of comparable economic and labor market institutions and performance. 
General Market Orientation 
The most widely used measures of the overall operation of economies are in-
dices of economic freedom. Since the 1980s, the Fraser Institute in Canada has 
produced the most extensive index of economic freedom based on metrics for 
"personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, and protection of 
person and property" (Gwartney and Lawson 2002,5). The Fraser index scales 
economies from 1 to 10, where higher scores reflect greater dependence of out-
comes on markets as opposed to institutions. Since 1995, the Heritage Foun-
dation/Wall Street Journal (Heritage/WSJ) has provided the competing Index 
of Economic Freedom that scores countries on a different list of variables. 
The conservative orientation of the Fraser Institute and of the Heritage/WSJ 
affects how they define economic freedom. Both code protection of property 
as a positive factor in economic freedom but code protection of labor as re-
ducing economic freedom on the grounds that it restricts the ability of busi-
nesses to make decisions. Both score government regulations and welfare state 
spending as lowering economic freedom, although these institutions arguably 
Hmit monopoly power and expand the economic freedom of disadvantaged 
groups. Issues of nomenclature and of the specific ways the foundations code 
variables aside, the indices provide a reasonably valid picture of the market ori-
entation of economies. 
Columns 1 and 2 of table intro. 1 give the Fraser and Heritage/WSJ rankings 
of the Anglo-American economies, of other advanced Organisation for Eco-
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TABLE INTRO. 1 
Advanced economies ranked by the market orientation of the overall economy, the labor market, and 
the government share in economic activity 
United States 
United Kingdom 
New Zealand 
Ireland 
Australia 
Canada 
Mean (SD) AA 
Mean (SD) others 
less Asian Tigers 
t-statistic for difference 
Switzerland 
Netherlands 
Finland 
Iceland 
Denmark 
Luxembourg 
Austria 
Belgium 
Germany 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Japan 
Norway 
Spain 
Italy 
France 
Greece 
Asian tigers 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Korea 
Overall 
Fraser, 
2003 
EFA 
3 
6 
3 
s 
9 
7 
6 (2.5) 
23.1 (13) 
5.18 
3 
13 
17 
13 
13 
9 
13 
20 
19 
34 
24 
30 
24 
30 
54 
38 
38 
1 
2 
24 
35 
economy 
Heritage, 
2005 
EFA 
12 
7 
5 
5 
10 
16 
9.2 (4.4) 
23.5(14.8) 
3.56 
12 
17 
15 
8 
8 
3 
19 
21 
18 
37 
14 
39 
29 
31 
26 
44 
59 
1 
2 
27 
45 
Labor market 
Fraser, 
2003 
Labor* 
10 
19 
38 
47 
32 
25 
28.5(13.3) 
66.5 (27.6) 
4.42 
34 
52 
90 
12 
71 
33 
83 
63 
101 
77 
96 
2S 
89 
54 
95 
5S 
94 
5 
42 
61 
SI 
GLS, 
2005 
6 
13 
16 
17 
17 
15 
14(4.2) 
25(3.8) 
5.42 
19 
29 
26 
— 
26 
— 
25 
29 
23 
— 
29 
17 
27 
— 
24 
26 
— 
— 
9 
7 
10 
Government role 
Gov't 
spending as 
% o f 
GDP, 2003 
35.9 
42.8 
39.8 
35.2 
36.2 
40.1 
38.3 (3.0) 
49.0 (5.7) 
5.63 
— 
48.6 
51 
46.5 
56.6 
— 
51.6 
49.7 
49.4 
46.8 
59 
38.3 
48.4 
39.3 
48.5 
54.4 
46.7 
— 
— 
— 
— 
Social 
expenditure 
as % of 
GDP, 2001 
14.7 
21.8 
18.5 
13.8 
18.0 
17.8 
17(3.0) 
24.2(3.8) 
4.71 
26.4 
21.8 
24.S 
19.8 
29.2 
20.8 
26 
27.2 
27.4 
21.1 
29.8 
16.7 
23.9 
19.6 
24.5 
28.5 
24.3 
— 
— 
— 
— 
Sources: Heritage Foundation (2005) 2005 Index of Economic Freedom; Gwartney and Lawson, with Gartzke (2005) 
Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report; Global Labor Survey (2005); Chor and Freeman (2005); U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (2005) Statistical Abstract, table 1344 using government expenditures; OECD Social Expendi-
ture Database: Total public social expenditure (1980-2001) by main category, as a percentage of total GDP 
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/37/31613113.xls). Note that the OECD provides other estimates in Factbook 2006 
and in Adema and Ladaique (2005). 
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, and of the four 
'Asian Tiger' economies (Hong Kong, Singapore,Taiwan, and South Korea), re-
spectively. The numbers in the ranking exceed the numbers in the table because 
the rankings include developing economies that we do not report in the table. 
The summary statistics give the average unweighted scores and standard devi-
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ations for the scores for the Anglo-American economies and for the other ad-
vanced economies exclusive of the Asian Tiger economies, and the t-statistics 
for the differences between those means. 
The Anglo-American economies rank higher in their market orientation 
than do the other advanced (non-Asian Tiger) economies. The standard devi-
ations of the scores for the Anglo-American economies in the Fraser Institute 
rankings are extremely low. This shows that they have very similar market-ori-
ented economic institutions. Using a t-test to measure the difference between 
the mean Fraser Institute rating in economic freedom for the Anglo-American 
economies and other advanced economies (again, exclusive of the Asian 
Tigers), gives a statistically significant 5.18. We treat the Asian Tiger economies, 
listed at the bottom of the table, separately because they vary so much in their 
market orientation. Singapore and Hong Kong, which have the English com-
mon law tradition, place at the top of the overall economy indices, while Tai-
wan and Korea, whose histories are quite different, score considerably lower on 
the free market scale. 
The Heritage/WSJ index shows greater variability in the rankings of the An-
glo-American economies and smaller differences between them and the other 
advanced economies. It gives a lower ranking for the United States and Canada, 
and higher ranks for some of the EU countries. Some of this seems due to the 
way the Heritage/WSJ index treats the labor market. For instance, the Heritage/ 
WSJ index gives Sweden the same free market score on wages and prices as the 
United States, despite Sweden's greater dependence on institutions in wage set-
ting.4 Still, this index also shows that the Anglo-American economies form a 
distinct group closer to the free market ideal than the other advanced econo-
mies. The t-statistic for the difference in means is a statistically significant 3.56. 
Disaggregating the Fraser index of economic freedom into its basic compo-
nents reveals the reasons for the differences in freedom indices among the ad-
vanced countries. The Fraser index gives all advanced economies comparable 
high scores in several indicators of market orientation: protection of property 
rights, independent legal systems, sound monetary policies, free trade. The ad-
vanced countries score closer to an "invisible hand" ideal than do developing 
countries in all of these measures. This produces the positive correlations be-
tween economic freedom indices and levels of GDP that analysts find in stud-
ies of the economic freedom indices (Gwartney and Lawson, with Gartzke 
2005; Heritage Foundation 2005). The differences among advanced economies 
occur in two areas: labor market institutions, which are more significant in ad-
vanced countries than in developing countries, and which play a bigger role in 
determining wages and working conditions in EU countries than in the Anglo-
4
 Apparently Sweden's reliance on the market to set product prices dominates Sweden's use of col-
lective bargaining to determine wages. 
12 What Workers Say 
American countries; and the government share of GDP, which tends to be high 
in countries with extensive welfare states such as the Nordic countries. 
Column 3 records the rankings of economies in the Fraser Institute sub-
index for the market orientation of labor markets.5 Until 2001, the Fraser in-
dex dealt only cursorily with labor institutions. In its 2001 report, however, the 
institute presented a more comprehensive freedom index for fifty-eight coun-
tries that included six indicators of labor institutions. By 2003, it had extended 
these measures to 103 countries. The rankings of countries by labor market sta-
tus gives high scores to countries with little or no labor protection, such as 
Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, Zambia, and Haiti (the top four countries 
in the Fraser labor market freedom subindex for 2003), while giving low scores 
to countries that have well-developed legal systems of protecting workers, such 
as Germany and Sweden. This scoring creates some odd differences and pro-
duces a negative relation between "economic freedom" in the labor market and 
GDP per capita (Freeman 2004). Still, the subindex gives a sensible ranking of 
the advanced countries. It rates the Anglo-American economies higher on re-
liance on the labor market to determine labor outcomes than other advanced 
economies.6 
Column 4 of table intro. 1 records the rankings of countries in the market 
orientation of their labor market from a different source—the 2004 Global La-
bor Survey (GLS) (Chor and Freeman 2005). The GLS is an internet-based sur-
vey that asked selected union leaders, labor relations professors, government 
officials, company labor relations executives, and other experts to report on the 
actual situation of labor in their country. The sample consisted disproportion-
ately of respondents favorable to labor institutions (Chor and Freeman 2005). 
This contrasts with the market orientation of the analysts who construct the 
economic freedom indices of the Fraser Institute and the Heritage/WSJ. The 
GLS index shows, however, a similar country pattern to the Fraser labor index: 
Anglo-American economies depend more on the labor market and less on in-
stitutions to determine labor outcomes than do the other advanced economies. 
Once again, the t-statistic for the difference in means is significant. That the 
rankings of countries by labor practices are similar in the GLS and Fraser mea-
sures indicates that the orientation of analysts did not noticeably affect their 
reporting of country labor practices. 
Turning to the role of the government in the economy, column 5 of table in-
tro.l records the proportion of GDP that consists of government expenditures. 
It shows that government plays a smaller role in the Anglo-American econ-
omies than in others. Column 6 gives the proportion of GDP that the OECD 
5
 As the Swedish-US. comparison in the text indicates, the Heritage/WSJ index does not delve in 
depth into labor market issues. Its subindex treats price and wage setting together. 
6
 Because the Heritage/WSJ measure of economic freedom does not treat the labor market with the 
same attention, we do not report its subindex in table intro.l. 
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categorizes as social expenditures.7 It shows that much of the difference in the 
government share of GDP takes the form of smaller welfare state interventions 
designed to buttress the living standards of lower-income groups in the Anglo-
American countries than in others. As before, the differences in the means for 
these two statistical measures are significant. The Anglo-American country 
with the highest government and social expenditures' share of GDP is the 
United Kingdom, whose spending falls below all but two of the non-Anglo-
American countries (Japan and Spain in column 5 and Japan and Iceland in 
column 6). 
It seems, then, that common descent among the Anglo-American countries 
has manifested itself in some common economic behaviors. The Anglo-Amer-
ican economies are, in general, more market friendly with relatively smaller 
governments than other advanced capitalist economies. 
Labor Market Outcomes and Institutional Patterns 
Data on labor market outcomes and institutions strengthen our contention 
that the Anglo-American economies constitute a distinct group for analysis. 
With respect to outcomes, perhaps no aspect of the economic performance of 
the Anglo-American economies has attracted as much attention as the low un-
employment rate and high employment rates that they generated in the 1990s 
to mid-2000s. On the basis of the better employment and unemployment 
record of the Anglo-American economies (figure intro.l), many policy-mak-
ers and analysts in the EU have come to believe that Anglo-American labor in-
stitutions are superior to EU labor institutions in creating full employment. 
Whether this claim is empirically justifiable or not (Freeman 2005), there is no 
gainsaying that the labor institutions as well as labor market outcomes differ 
greatly between the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Ireland, 
Canada, and New Zealand, and most other advanced countries. 
The first and, arguably, most important institutional difference between the 
Anglo-American and other advanced economies is found in the extent of 
unionization and use of collective bargaining to determine wages. In 2000, 
union density in the Anglo-American economies averaged 26 percent while 
density in the other countries averaged 38 percent.8 But the bigger difference 
is in the percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining. In many EU 
countries, mandatory extension of collective bargaining contracts brings many 
workers and firms who were not part of the agreement under its terms. In the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, this was never the case. In 
New Zealand and Australia, wages and conditions were historically set by a cen-
7
 The OECD defines this to measure "the extent to which governments assume responsibility for 
supporting the standard of living of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups." 
8
 Based on data from the OECD (2004, table 3.3). 
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Figure intro.l: Unemployment and employment/population rates in the Anglo-American (AA) 
economies and other advanced economies (other) 
Source: Tabulated from OECD (2005). 
tralized award system, in which courts effectively extended agreements to the 
entire economy. But New Zealand ended its centralized system in 1991 and 
Australia began moving away from its award system in the mid-1990s. Collec-
tive bargaining coverage fell hugely in New Zealand and began to decline in 
Australia in the 2000s, following a significant decentralization of bargaining to 
the plant and company level. The exception to this pattern is Ireland, which in 
1987 developed a Social Pact for wage-setting to help the country escape from 
a major recession. Consistent with the Anglo-American traditions of decen-
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Figure intro.2: Percentage of workers unionized and percentage covered by collective bargaining, 
2000 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004. Copyright OECD, 2004. Data for Ireland are not available. 
tralized decision-making, however, the unions balloted members over poten-
tial settlements as part of their involvement in the Pact.9 
Figure intro.2 shows how the Anglo-American economies compare to other 
advanced countries in the rate of unionization and collective bargaining cov-
erage in 2000. The 45 degree line represents the situation where the rate of col-
lective bargaining equals the rate of unionization and thus where there is no 
9
 In their classification of countries according to "patterns of bargaining coordination," Ebbinghaus 
and Kittel (2005) emphasize the diversity within the Anglo-American camp over the period 1971-98 
because of the New Zealand, Australian, and Irish cases. We would argue that since 1998 the Anglo-
American countries have become significantly less "mixed" in terms of bargaining coordination pat-
terns: there is no evidence that the regulatory changes in New Zealand in 2000 have moved New Zealand 
away from the "flexible uncoordinated bargaining" pattern that Ebbinghaus and Kittel ascribe to the 
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom; and Australia has moved firmly into this camp (chap-
ter 5 in this book). 
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extension of contracts. Points above the line reflect some form of extension. 
Four of the six Anglo-American countries lie along line. Ireland lies above it.10 
In 2000, Australia was considerably above the line, but Australian collective 
bargaining coverage has fallen since then toward the line. 
Collective bargaining is the critical institution in wage setting, leading to 
many categorizations of wage-setting systems in advanced countries in terms 
of the extent and nature of such bargaining (OECD 1997). The most recent 
analysis by the OECD (OECD 2004, table 3.5) used two related categoriza-
tions—one which divided collective bargaining arrangements into five groups 
based on centralization of bargaining and one which divided the arrangements 
to allow for coordinated bargaining. The centralization grouping ranged from 
economies where wages were predominantly determined at the company and 
plant level (scored as 1) to economies where central-level agreements were of 
over-riding importance (scored as 5). This categorization placed four of the 
Anglo-American countries in the most market determined group, put Aus-
tralia into the second most market determined wage group and put Ireland into 
the second most centralized wage-setting group (OECD 2004, table 3.5). Taken 
as a whole, the Anglo-American economies averaged 1.8 on the wage-setting 
institution scale while the other advanced OECD countries averaged 2.8. 
When countries determine pay by collective bargaining or other institu-
tions, they almost invariably compress the distribution of earnings. Given the 
reliance of the Anglo-American countries on markets for setting wages, we ex-
pect that these countries would have greater dispersion of wages than other ad-
vanced countries. The horizontal axis of figure intro.3 records one widely used 
indicator of pay dispersion, the ratio of the pay of persons in the ninetieth per-
centile of wages and salaries relative to the pay of persons in the tenth per-
centile. The United States has the highest dispersion; Norway has the lowest. 
The mean for the Anglo-American countries is 3.65, statistically significantly 
higher than the 2.85 mean for the other countries. 
Another institutional difference between Anglo-American economies and 
most other advanced country economies relates to employment protection 
given to workers on the job. In the Anglo-American economies, employers 
"own" jobs and can lay off workers with little legal restriction. In other ad-
vanced countries, workers tend to have greater employment protection. This 
often takes the form of requiring that firms negotiate with a works council on 
a "social plan" for retraining before they lay off workers; and of paying legally 
mandated severance pay when the firm chooses to lay them off. Such regula-
tions have the potential for increasing employment by making it more expen-
sive to lay off workers. But they also have the potential to decrease employment 
10
 Although comparable data are not available for Ireland, expert opinion places Ireland above the 
linefseeOchel [2001] andVisser [2000] for the mid-1990s and European Commission [2003] for 2000). 
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Figure intro.3: The Anglo-American economies and other advanced economies, dispersion of pay 
and employment policy regulations) 
Source: EP regulations: OECD (2004), table 2.A2.4, version 2; wage dispersion: OECD (2004), table 
3.2. Note that data are from 1995 through 1999 with figures from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Portu-
gal for 1990—1994, and data for Spain and Greece from Martins and Pereira (2004), table 1. 
by making hiring more expensive, since firms recognize that if they have to lay 
off workers, it will cost more. In theory, the regulations or collective bargain-
ing could set just the right severance pay to shift income from employers to 
workers without having an effect on employment. Empirical studies suggest 
that the regulations have little effect on the overall rate of unemployment but 
shift unemployment from older workers to younger job seekers (OECD 20Q4). 
The vertical axis of figure intro.3 measures employment protection legisla-
tion (EPL), as indexed by the OECD. There is no overlap between Anglo-Amer-
ican economies and the other advanced economies. The Anglo-American 
economy with the strongest EPL regulations, Australia, had markedly weaker 
EPL regulations than the countries with the weakest protection outside of the 
Anglo-American group, Denmark and Switzerland. And the labor market leg-
islation adopted by the Australian Government in 2006 will increase the space 
between the Anglo-American countries and others since it will considerably re-
duce Australian workers' employment protections. By displaying the disper-
sion of earnings and the difference in employment protection legislation 
together, figure intro.3 shows starkly the difference between the operation of 
the labor markets in Anglo-American economies and those in other advanced 
economies. 
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Labor laws and regulations help determine the way in which a country di-
vides the responsibility for labor market outcomes between market forces, 
largely operating through the behavior of firms, and institutions, largely oper-
ating through unions. To measure the strength of regulations, Botero et al. 
(2003) coded the laws regulating employment contracts, industrial relations, 
and social security regulations in 85 countries. Higher values indicate greater 
labor regulations. The Anglo-American countries have lower scores than the 
other advanced (non-Asian Tiger) countries in all three areas but the magni-
tude of the differences between the Anglo-American countries and other ad-
vanced countries varies greatly. Using a t-statistic to measure the difference 
between the means, the greatest difference is for industrial relations laws, fol-
lowed by employment laws, with no statistically significant difference for so-
cial security regulations. 
The laws governing labor are likely to influence how the labor markets func-
tion and workplace practices, but they are unlikely to be determinative. De jure 
rulings do not inevitably produce de facto practices on the ground. One way to 
see how country labor systems differ in practice is to ask business and labor 
practitioners about the ways in which the labor markets in their country 
operate. 
For the business view, we rely on the global competitiveness reports of the 
World Economic Forum (WEF). The WEF asks executives annually how their 
country performs in diverse areas, including some aspects of labor market per-
formance (World Economic Forum 2003). Table intro.2 gives the average rank-
ing of the Anglo-American countries and other (non-Asian Tiger) advanced 
countries in four dimensions of labor market decision-making for 2003. 
Column 1 shows that executives in the Anglo-American countries reported 
that their country relied less on wage-setting institutions than the executives in 
other countries, though the mean difference is not huge. The differences are 
not huge because Ireland had a highly centralized wage-setting system while 
Australian wage setting was moderately centralized in 2002-03. Column 2 
gives the average ranking of countries by the extent to which management can 
relate pay to productivity. On this dimension, Ireland and Australia are closer 
to the other Anglo-American countries, producing a higher t-statistic for the 
difference between the Anglo-American economies and the other advanced 
economies. Column 3 turns to hiring and firing practices—the employment 
protection laws described earlier. Executives in the Anglo-American countries 
give their country a more market-oriented ranking on this dimension because, 
as we have already seen, those countries have weaker protections for workers. 
The United States, which has the strongest "employment at will" rules among 
the Anglo-American economies, and where firms are free to replace workers 
who go on strike, is the Anglo-American country with the highest market score 
(World Economic Forum 2003, table 10.18). 
